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In July of 1985, Attorney General Edwin Meese addressed the national convention of the American Bar Association with hopes of in1
spiring a fundamental change in constitutional interpretation. He
railed against the Supreme Court’s unprincipled turn towards a “jurisprudence of idiosyncrasy,” lamented recent decisions as “more policy choices than articulations of constitutional principle,” and called
urgently on the Justices to adopt “a coherent jurisprudential stance,”
2
lest a “constitution in the true sense” cease to exist. Meese had a
particular stance in mind, and, to no one’s surprise, it was not a re3
turn to the Warren Court’s brand of “radical egalitarianism.” Rather, he claimed that the only interpretive theory adequate to protect
our democratic institutions and the rule of law is “a jurisprudence of
4
original intention.” Of course, most such attempts to initiate broad
interpretive change have fairly limited effect, but Meese’s speech
seemed to engage an idea whose time had come, and, in retrospect, it
helped bring about something of a sea change in constitutional theory. To wit, Justice Antonin Scalia recently reflected that, unlike circumstances at the time of his appointment, “[o]riginalism is [now] in
5
the game, even if it does not always prevail.” And, a little over a decade after Meese’s speech, Laurence Tribe would summarize some of
Ronald Dworkin’s thoughts with what has become a contemporary
6
ubiquity: “We are all originalists now.”
While Meese certainly did not invent originalism, his speech undoubtedly helped revive an approach that had fallen into some dis-
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use. Perhaps nowhere is this resurgence more evident than in the le7
gal academy, where Meese contemporaries like Raoul Berger and
8
Robert Bork have passed the torch to a younger generation of “New
Originalists,” who have abandoned the archaeology of “original intentions” and now search for various forms of “original public mean9
ing.” This “new” originalism concedes that intentions are not meaning, and recognizes that, to the extent that history should inform
constitutional interpretation, the relevant moment is ratification and
10
not drafting. Contemporary originalists have also generally come to
accept that constitutional language may be underdetermined, and
thus concede that modern interpreters will sometimes need to “construct” legal rules in ways that rely on “something other than original
11
meaning.” Nonetheless, most modern originalists believe that original meaning must contribute something quite substantial to consti12
tutional interpretation. Indeed, Larry Solum—perhaps the most inclusive of the New Originalists—has argued that almost all originalists
share two essential commitments: (1) the fixation thesis, which claims
that constitutional meaning is “fixed” or “frozen” at a particular moment in time; and (2) a reasonably strong version of the contribution
thesis, which holds that, absent weighty reasons, this fixed meaning
13
must “constrain” modern interpretive decisions.
In earlier work, I have attacked the first of these commitments,
and I continue to believe that with ordinary language usage—
particularly vague usage—meaning is not the sort of thing that can be
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“fixed.” And some key constitutional clauses certainly present them15
selves as ordinary language constructions. In this essay, however, I
turn my attention to the second originalist commitment—the socalled “contribution thesis.” Assuming here that constitutional meaning could be fixed in time, I contend that, Ed Meese notwithstanding,
it is actually the contribution thesis—at least in its strong forms—that
compromises the rule of law. Originalism of this type would have
“historical understandings” displace the judiciary as the principal ex16
positor of legal meanings. One of the core features of the American
conception of the rule of law is that it is the law—not the lawgiver or
her intentions—that obligates us, and, when the text is vague, an institutionalized judiciary is authorized to act as its interpreter. The interposition of a binding historical exegetist between the text and the
judge thus compromises the basic structural commitments of American democracy. We should therefore understand this sort of originalism as a political ideology and not a theory of the Constitution as it ex17
ists.
VAGUENESS AND THE RULE OF LAW
Quarrels about textual meaning rarely arise over determinate constitutional provisions like the Presidential age requirement. In such
cases, the relevant linguistic rules are suitably precise and our prac14
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tices well enough settled that the law essentially speaks for itself. It is
rather the underdetermined or vague constitutional language that
gives us trouble, exactly because the underlying rules and practices
governing its meaning are themselves imprecise and controversial.
Logically speaking, the problem is straightforward: a vague proposi18
tion may have no determinate truth value. Whether it is true, for
example, that a particular kind of legal protection is “equal” to another depends upon how we measure equality, and it may be the case
that two perfectly reasonable kinds of measurement yield contradictory results. And so we cannot, as David Lewis says, “pick a delineation once and for all . . . but must consider the entire range of rea19
sonable delineations.” Thus, unlike the Presidential Age Clause, the
Equal Protection Clause cannot speak for itself, and so requires an
interpreter. In our legal tradition, that job lies with the judge, who
may consider and adopt any reasonable measurement to decide a
given case. Originalist ideology, however, makes “historical understanding” superior to the judge, and would thus confine “equal” to
reasonable historical measurements. This, I contend, is at odds with
well-accepted ideas about the rule of law.
Without a working account of the “rule of law,” of course, this final assertion only begs the question, and so to better define the con20
cept I turn to Brian Tamanaha’s thoughtful descriptive efforts. In a
recent lecture, Tamanaha summarized some of his earlier work with a
“thin” definition—“[t]he rule of law means that government officials
and citizens are bound by and abide by the law”—which he fleshed
out with three core “themes” or “notions” of usage and practice: (1)
“government is limited by law”; (2) “formal legality”; and (3) “[t]he
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The late and eminent David Lewis summarized the issue well:
If Fred is a borderline case of baldness, the sentence “Fred is bald” may have no
determinate truth value. Whether it is true depends on where you draw the line.
Relative to some perfectly reasonable ways of drawing a precise boundary between
bald and not-bald, the sentence is true. Relative to other delineations, no less reasonable, it is false. Nothing in our use of language makes one of these delineations right and all the others wrong. We cannot pick a delineation once and for
all (not if we are interested in ordinary language), but must consider the entire
range of reasonable delineations.
DAVID LEWIS, Scorekeeping in a Language Game, in 1 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 233, 244
(1983).
Id. “Reasonable” here points towards the accepted practical usage conventions, which
may, again, be underdetermined.
See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY (2004);
Brian Z. Tamanaha, The History and Elements of the Rule of Law, (Washington Univ. in St.
Louis Legal Studies Research Paper Series, No. 12-02-07, 2012), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2012845.
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rule of law, not man.”
The American embodiment of the first
theme is a semi-independent prosecuting branch and a structural division of government that gives “the judiciary the capacity to hold the
22
other parts answerable on legal grounds.” The second theme promotes predictability by demanding that laws be published in advance,
that they not “demand the impossible,” and that they be generally
23
applicable “according to their terms.” The third theme requires
that neutral principles supersede individual caprice, enforcement of
which, in the American model, remains “the special preserve of judg24
es,” who must be “unbiased” and “loyal to the law alone.” These
three core themes provide a useful framework against which we can
assess and explore my claim that originalist ideology subverts the rule
of law.
I will consider the second theme—“formal legality”—first, both
because it underpins the other themes, and because it is in assessing
this notion that the fundamental problem with originalism becomes
most clear. Leaving aside the problem of laws that demand the im25
possible, formal legality requires that the laws be set forth in advance and bind all according to their published terms. These requirements ensure that the laws are predictable and provide notice to
all. Originalist interpretive ideologies, however, compromise both
these guiding principles and their purposes. Indeed, in many cases,
originalism does not treat the prior published text as law at all. Rather, the
published text and terms act only as a placeholder for some set of “historical understandings,” which in fact contain the relevant legal con26
tent. As a crude illustration, imagine a Yellow Pages entry that simply refers the user to a different location: “Cinemas: See Theaters.” In
the context of originalist ideology this might become, “Cruel and
Unusual Punishment: See Penal Codes, 1789.” Under such a theory,
we bar those younger than thirty-five from the Presidency based on
27
the public meaning of “the Age of thirty five Years” in 1789—not
21
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Tamanaha, History and Elements, supra note 20, at 2, 3, 8. Tamanaha considers each of
these themes in a great deal more depth in his book on the subject. See TAMANAHA, ON
THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 20, at 114–26.
Tamanaha, History and Elements, supra note 20, at 14.
Id. at 15.
Id. at 22.
In this context, however, it is interesting to think about recent “positive right” constitutions—such as South Africa’s—that may ask their governments to meet impossible demands. See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST. ch. 2, §§ 26–27 (guaranteeing access to minimum housing
and health care).
Sean Wilson has argued that such a view treats the text as a “gesture,” or something akin
to a religious sacrament, in which meaning lies somewhere beyond the actual utterance.
WILSON, supra note 16, at 35–36.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
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because there is broad agreement on that phrase’s public meaning
today. For originalists, then, the Constitution’s published terms are
not actually the law, which is instead hidden in a set of extra-legal his28
torical norms and conceptions. This compromises both the law’s
“formal” character and the goals of notice and predictability, and
thus subverts the rule of law as we understand that idea.
So what are we to do with vague constitutional language, which
seems to be somewhat unpredictable all by itself? The answer is simple, if unsatisfying to some. Formal legality requires us to treat vague
published language as the law, even if it is less predictable than other,
more determinate provisions. It must be the published terms themselves—not some hidden set of historical conceptions—which bind us
moving forward. In a government dedicated to the rule of law, the
lawmaker who hopes to bind future generations to specific or determinate legal conceptions must make those conceptions explicit in the
enacted text. There is a difference, in other words, between declaring that the President must be “mature” and requiring that he “have
29
attained to the Age of thirty five Years,” and formal legality requires
us to recognize the law in the particular form that it appears. When
that form is vague or underdetermined, we must accept that the law
leaves questions of specific application or conception to its designated interpreter, which brings us to the other two themes underlying
the rule of law.
Tamanaha’s remaining themes—“government limited by law” and
“rule of law, not man”—speak to related ideas about the function and
limits of the judiciary under the rule of law. Our constitutional structure works to ensure that law limits the government by dividing authority among several branches, and by empowering the judicial
branch to hold the legislative and executive branches to account. As
Tamanaha says, this architecture makes the interpretation and appli30
cation of law “the special preserve of judges,” and I suggest that efforts to divest the judiciary of this authority—or to constrain it in the
service of extra-legal policy preferences—compromise the structural
means by which we have sought to limit government by law. Indeed,
Miguel Schor has observed that a weakened, politicized judiciary is
28
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Ronald Dworkin has famously made the distinction between a concept and its conceptions:
Suppose I tell my children simply that I expect them not to treat others unfairly. I
no doubt have in mind examples of the conduct I mean to discourage, but I would
not accept that my “meaning” was limited to these examples . . . . I might say that I
meant the family to be guided by the concept of fairness, not by any specific conception of fairness I might have had in mind.
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134 (1977).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
Tamanaha, History and Elements, supra note 20, at 22.
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among the “key features of . . . the un-rule of law” in developing na31
tions. And this is exactly the danger of an interpretive ideology that
makes judicial interpretation subservient to “historical understandings,” which in turn promote the conceptual preferences of a past
culture. Thus, originalist ideologies, at least those that depend upon
strong versions of the contribution thesis, not only violate the principle of formal legality, they also subvert our efforts to limit government by law. It is for these reasons that I contend that originalism is
inconsistent with the rule of law, and suggest that we must leave judges free to engage all reasonable interpretive strategies in fulfilling
their constitutional role.
Of course, entrusting judges with such broad authority presents its
own substantial risks to the rule of law, particularly when courts are
called upon to interpret vague constitutional language in concrete
cases. There is the danger, as Tamanaha points out, “that the rule of
law might become rule by judges”; that is, if the courts cannot remain
politically neutral and “loyal to the law alone,” we might just as easily
find ourselves subject to the arbitrary whim of a judge as of any other
32
person. Indeed, it is precisely this danger that has led Ed Meese and
others to endorse the binding constraint of originalist ideology. But,
as I have demonstrated above, this kind of extra-legal constraint is inconsistent with other broadly accepted notions about the rule of law,
and so it cannot provide the sort of remedy that originalists are seeking. This is not to say that judges are, or should be, completely unconstrained in their decision-making. Rather, they must operate
within the accepted norms governing constitutional interpretive prac33
tice. Historical arguments are certainly an important part of that
practice, but, in keeping with the rule of law, we cannot treat them as
the only permissible—or even the strongly preferred—grounds of judicial
interpretation. If history is to constrain interpretation, it must be because the judge so decides in a particular case, not because the contribution thesis—or any external normative construct—categorically
commands it.
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Miguel Schor, Rule of Law, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & SOCIETY: AMERICAN AND GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVES 1329, 1330 (David S. Clark ed., 2007). Along these same lines, David
Strauss has recently argued that originalism compromises the candor and Burkean legitimacy inherent in our longstanding common law tradition. See DAVID STRAUSS, THE
LIVING CONSTITUTION 43–46 (2010).
Tamanaha, History and Elements, supra note 20, at 22, 24 (emphasis in original).
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BEYOND THE DEAD HAND PROBLEM
This objection to originalism—call it the “legality objection” for
short—is both more and less than the so-called (and much rehearsed) “dead hand problem,” and explaining why may help clarify
my claim. The claim is more because, while “dead hand” theories
generally suggest that originalism results in undemocratic applications of law, the “legality objection” contends that binding original34
ism does not treat the Constitution as law at all. The claim is less because
I do not suggest that the “dead hand” of the past cannot bind us in
democratically legitimate ways—this is, after all, an essential feature
of law’s authority—but, rather, that it must do so through the text and
not by resort to extra-legal historical norms.
To explore these distinctions in more depth, we need a working
account of the “dead hand” problem, and Reva Siegel has offered as
good a summary as any:
It has been hundreds of years since the Constitution was ratified. No one
alive today participated in the ratification process. The cumbersome supermajority rules of Article V make amending the Constitution so much
more difficult than other forms of legislative change that, since ratification of the Bill of Rights, the Constitution has been amended less than
twenty times. The living have not assented to Article V as the sole method of constitutional change. And if we are to construe the living as having implicitly consented to any constitutional understanding or arrangement, it is to the Constitution as it is currently interpreted, with its many
35
pathways of change.

The objection is thus to originalism’s democratic legitimacy as an interpretive practice given the (perhaps unintended) insurmountability of
36
The difficulty of amendment
Article V’s amendment hurdles.
makes the Constitution’s normative commitments practically unassailable, and thus largely unaccountable to the American people. In
our political theory and tradition, of course, government derives its
37
“just powers from the consent of the governed,” and so, to preserve
democratic legitimacy, the Supreme Court should provide an Article
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Again, at least this much of the “legality objection” derives directly from Sean Wilson’s
work. See WILSON, supra note 16, at 149 (“[I]t makes no sense to set forth a constitution
as ‘the law,’ yet retain some other mysterious entity from the past that controls who wins
or loses the cases, and what the hidden principles are.”).
Reva B. Siegel, Heller & Originalism’s Dead Hand—In Theory and Practice, 56 UCLA L. REV.
1399, 1404–05 (2009) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
For an interesting take on Article V’s “imbecilic” design, see Sanford Levinson, Our Imbecilic Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2012, http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/
2012/05/28/our-imbecilic-constitution.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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V workaround by interpreting the Constitution as a “living” document.
The essential claim here is that the Constitution suffers from a serious and probably permanent design defect: Article V. Notice that if
the Constitution were more easily amended the “dead hand” problem
would largely dissolve, just as Raoul Berger supposed was true back in
1981: “[o]f course the dead cannot bind us; nor did they seek to do
so. Instead, the Framers provided us with an instrument of change—
38
amendment pursuant to Article V.” In such a circumstance, presumably, those who rely solely on the “dead hand” objection would
have no problem with a strong version of originalism. For them the
problem with binding originalism is contextual and not categorical. It is
our peculiar, flawed Constitution—not the theory itself—that makes
originalist approaches problematic. In this sense the “legality objection” claims more than the “dead hand problem”; indeed, it is categorical. Even if we could readily modify constitutional terms to suit the
living, the “legality objection” claims that approaches that would bind
us to extra-legal “historical understandings” of the text are always inconsistent with the rule of law.
I have also said that the “legality objection” is less than the “dead
hand problem,” and we are now in a better position to see why. Unlike “dead hand” complaints, the “legality objection” does not claim
that efforts to bind future generations through law pose a threat to
democratic legitimacy. Indeed, as I have said, this is a central feature
of law’s claim to authority: present enactments—if made pursuant to
suitably democratic secondary rules—will impose legitimate future
obligations. In other words, even if the Framers had chosen to omit
Article V entirely, or had expressly made the Constitution unamenda39
ble (as in the case of Senate apportionment), the “legality objection”
has no quarrel with past majorities binding present ones—provided
they do so explicitly through law. The objection, rather, is to an ideology that would interpose extra-textual historical understandings or
norms between the modern reader and the law itself. If, for example,
the Presidential age requirement were as unpopular today as is the
claim that the Fourteenth Amendment excludes women, presumably
“dead hand” theorists would find both rules equally lacking in democratic legitimacy. Not so the “legality objection,” which holds that any
duly enacted law properly binds future generations to the plain
meaning of its published terms.

38
39

Raoul Berger, Paul Brest’s Brief for an Imperial Judiciary, 40 MD. L. REV. 1, 3 (1981).
Article V, of course, expressly provides “that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.” U.S. CONST. art. V.
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CONCLUSION
In the title and throughout this essay, I have referred to originalism as an “ideology” and have suggested that, despite rhetorical recourse to philosophical terms like “speaker’s meaning” and “semantic
40
content,” originalism is not an account of how our Constitution has
meaning in a culture dedicated to the rule of law. What I mean by
this is that originalism, by virtue of the contribution thesis, is an organized normative effort to bring about a fundamental change in our existing
political structure by making judges subservient to extra-legal constraints that generally advance a particular policy agenda. I hope I
have demonstrated that this ideology undermines broadly accepted
notions about the rule of law, and so—no matter how tempted we are
to bring “unfettered” judicial discretion under greater political control—binding external constraints on legal interpretive practices are
a cure worse than the disease. We must accept that both the rule of
law and our constitutional structure entrust judges with great authority and responsibility, and we must hope that our legal practices—in
courtrooms, boardrooms, and classrooms—can cultivate and maintain an interpretive culture that honors our most important democratic ideals.

40

I refer here to the description Larry Solum has offered in his highly influential account of
“semantic originalism.” See Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 9, at 34–37 (citing
PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 3–143 (1989)).

